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| % Publications & Preprints | |
| @misc{EPRINT:GajHwaJan25, | |
| author = {Phillip Gajland and Vincent Hwang and Jonas Janneck}, | |
| title = {Shadowfax: A Deniability-Preserving {AKEM} Combiner}, | |
| howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2025/154}, | |
| year = {2025}, | |
| url_ePrint = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2025/154}, | |
| url_code = {https://github.com/vincentvbh/shadowfax}, | |
| } | |
| @misc{EPRINT:GajJanKil24a, | |
| author = {Phillip Gajland and Jonas Janneck and Eike Kiltz}, | |
| title = {A Closer Look at Falcon}, | |
| howpublished = {Cryptology {ePrint} Archive, Paper 2024/1769}, | |
| year = {2024}, | |
| url_ePrint = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/1769} | |
| } | |
| @InProceedings{C:GajJanKil24, | |
| author = {Gajland, Phillip and Janneck, Jonas and Kiltz, Eike}, | |
| editor = {Reyzin, Leonid and Stebila, Douglas}, | |
| title = {Ring Signatures for Deniable AKEM: Gandalf's Fellowship}, | |
| booktitle = {Advances in Cryptology -- CRYPTO 2024}, | |
| year = {2024}, | |
| publisher = {Springer Nature Switzerland}, | |
| address = {Cham}, | |
| pages = {305--338}, | |
| doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-68376-3_10}, | |
| abstract = {Ring signatures, a cryptographic primitive introduced by Rivest, Shamir and Tauman (ASIACRYPT 2001), offer signer anonymity within dynamically formed user groups. Recent advancements have focused on lattice-based constructions to improve efficiency, particularly for large signing rings. However, current state-of-the-art solutions suffer from significant overhead, especially for smaller rings.}, | |
| isbn = {978-3-031-68376-3}, | |
| url_ePrint = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2024/890.pdf}, | |
| url_slides = {https://iacr.org/submit/files/slides/2024/crypto/crypto2024/471/slides.pdf}, | |
| url_video = {https://youtu.be/bDN4-Fxm8ho?t=1307} | |
| } | |
| @InProceedings{USENIX:GKQMS24, | |
| author = {Phillip Gajland and Bor de Kock and Miguel Quaresma and Giulio Malavolta and Peter Schwabe}, | |
| title = {{SWOOSH}: Efficient {Lattice-Based} {Non-Interactive} Key Exchange}, | |
| booktitle = {33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)}, | |
| year = {2024}, | |
| isbn = {978-1-939133-44-1}, | |
| address = {Philadelphia, PA}, | |
| pages = {487--504}, | |
| url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/gajland}, | |
| publisher = {USENIX Association}, | |
| month = aug, | |
| url_ePrint = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/271.pdf}, | |
| url_code = {https://github.com/MQuaresma/pswoosh}, | |
| url_slides = {./uploads/usenix24-slides.pdf}, | |
| url_video = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=IpavvH9hJm0} | |
| } | |
| @InProceedings{USENIX:FTGAFS24, | |
| author = {Konstantin Fischer and Ivana Trummov{\'a} and Phillip Gajland and Yasemin Acar and Sascha Fahl and Angela Sasse}, | |
| title = {The Challenges of Bringing Cryptography from Research Papers to Products: Results from an Interview Study with Experts}, | |
| booktitle = {33rd USENIX Security Symposium (USENIX Security 24)}, | |
| year = {2024}, | |
| isbn = {978-1-939133-44-1}, | |
| address = {Philadelphia, PA}, | |
| pages = {7213--7230}, | |
| url = {https://www.usenix.org/conference/usenixsecurity24/presentation/fischer}, | |
| publisher = {USENIX Association}, | |
| month = aug, | |
| url_PDF = {https://www.usenix.org/system/files/usenixsecurity24-fischer.pdf} | |
| } | |
| @InProceedings{AC:BalColGaj23, | |
| author = {Balb{\'a}s, David and Collins, Daniel and Gajland, Phillip}, | |
| editor = {Guo, Jian and Steinfeld, Ron}, | |
| title = {WhatsUpp with Sender Keys? Analysis, Improvements and Security Proofs}, | |
| booktitle = {Advances in Cryptology -- ASIACRYPT 2023}, | |
| year = {2023}, | |
| publisher = {Springer Nature Singapore}, | |
| address = {Singapore}, | |
| pages = {307--341}, | |
| doi = {10.1007/978-981-99-8733-7_10}, | |
| abstract = {Developing end-to-end encrypted instant messaging solutions for group conversations is an ongoing challenge that has garnered significant attention from practitioners and the cryptographic community alike. Notably, industry-leading messaging apps such as WhatsApp and Signal Messenger have adopted the Sender Keys protocol, where each group member shares their own symmetric encryption key with others Despite its widespread adoption, Sender Keys has never been formally modelled in the cryptographic literature, raising the following natural question: "What can be proven about the security of the Sender Keys protocol, and how can we practically mitigate its shortcomings?" In addressing this question, we first introduce a novel security model to suit protocols like Sender Keys, deviating from conventional group key agreement-based abstractions. Our framework allows for a natural integration of two-party messaging within group messaging sessions that may be of independent interest. Leveraging this framework, we conduct the first formal analysis of the Sender Keys protocol, and prove it satisfies a weak notion of security. Towards improving security, we propose a series of efficient modifications to Sender Keys without imposing significant performance overhead. We combine these refinements into a new protocol that we call Sender Keys+, which may be of interest both in theory and practice.}, | |
| isbn = {978-981-99-8733-7}, | |
| url_ePrint = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/1385.pdf}, | |
| note = {Preliminary version appeared at RECSI 2022 (Runner-up Best Paper Award)}, | |
| } | |
| @InProceedings{PKC:DotGajMal23, | |
| author = {D\"{o}ttling, Nico and Gajland, Phillip and Malavolta, Giulio}, | |
| title = {Laconic Function Evaluation For Turing Machines}, | |
| year = {2023}, | |
| isbn = {978-3-031-31370-7}, | |
| publisher = {Springer-Verlag}, | |
| address = {Berlin, Heidelberg}, | |
| url = {https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_21}, | |
| doi = {10.1007/978-3-031-31371-4_21}, | |
| abstract = {Laconic function evaluation (LFE) allows Alice to compress a large circuit C into a small digest d. Given Alice’s digest, Bob can encrypt some input x under d in a way that enables Alice to recover C(x), without learning anything beyond that. The scheme is said to be laconic if the size of d, the runtime of the encryption algorithm, and the size of the ciphertext are all sublinear in the size of C.Until now, all known LFE constructions have ciphertexts whose size depends on the depth of the circuit C, akin to the limitation of levelled homomorphic encryption. In this work we close this gap and present the first LFE scheme (for Turing machines) with asymptotically optimal parameters. Our scheme assumes the existence of indistinguishability obfuscation and somewhere statistically binding hash functions. As further contributions, we show how our scheme enables a wide range of new applications, including two previously unknown constructions:Non-interactive zero-knowledge (NIZK) proofs with optimal prover complexity.Witness encryption and attribute-based encryption (ABE) for Turing machines from falsifiable assumptions.}, | |
| booktitle = {Public-Key Cryptography – PKC 2023: 26th IACR International Conference on Practice and Theory of Public-Key Cryptography, Atlanta, GA, USA, May 7–10, 2023, Proceedings, Part II}, | |
| pages = {606–634}, | |
| numpages = {29}, | |
| location = {Atlanta, GA, USA}, | |
| url_ePrint = {https://eprint.iacr.org/2023/502.pdf}, | |
| url_slides = {https://iacr.org/submit/files/slides/2023/pkc/pkc2023/172/slides.pdf}, | |
| url_video = {https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Hgu7eWuuYus&t=1074s} | |
| } |
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