Author: Security Research Team
Date: January 26, 2026
Classification: Security Research
| <# | |
| .SYNOPSIS | |
| Performs comprehensive email security reconnaissance on one or more domains. | |
| .DESCRIPTION | |
| Invoke-EmailRecon performs parallel DNS lookups and HTTP requests to gather | |
| email security configuration data for specified domains. It collects information | |
| about MX records, SPF, DKIM, DMARC, BIMI, MTA-STS, TLS-RPT, DANE/TLSA, DNSSEC, | |
| CAA records, Microsoft 365/Entra ID tenant details, ADFS federation, and | |
| DNS blocklist status. |
| title: PIM-Enabled Group Self-Assignment | |
| id: b3d4e5f6-a7b8-4c9d-8e1f-2c3d4e5f6a7c | |
| status: stable | |
| description: | | |
| Detects when a user assigns themselves as an active or eligible member or owner of a group | |
| via Entra ID Group Management. This identifies potential indirect privilege escalation | |
| where a user adds themselves to a group that has been granted privileged administrative roles. | |
| references: | |
| - learn.microsoft.com | |
| author: Security Operations Center |
| title: PIM Privileged Role Self-Assignment | |
| id: a8d1c6e4-4f2b-4d9a-9e1b-2c3d4e5f6a7b | |
| status: stable | |
| description: | | |
| Detects when a user assigns a privileged role to their own account through PIM. | |
| By assigning themselves as an active or eligible member, an administrator can | |
| bypass the "four-eyes" principle and escalate their own privileges. | |
| references: | |
| - learn.microsoft.com | |
| author: Security Operations Center |
| // Alerts in last 24h | |
| let notJunkAlerts = | |
| AlertInfo | |
| | where Title == "Email reported by user as not junk" | |
| and TimeGenerated >= ago(1h) | |
| | project AlertId; | |
| let evidence = | |
| AlertEvidence | |
| | where AlertId in (notJunkAlerts) | |
| and isnotempty(NetworkMessageId) |
| function Invoke-StealthOperation { | |
| [CmdletBinding()] | |
| param( | |
| [Parameter(Mandatory = $false, ValueFromPipeline = $true)] | |
| [object]$InputObject, | |
| [Parameter(Mandatory = $false)] | |
| [ValidateSet("Random", "Progressive", "BusinessHours", "Exponential")] | |
| [string]$DelayType = "Random", |
Published: August 20, 2025 | By BlackCat Security Team
While developing reconnaissance tools for the BlackCat module, I kept running into a fundamental issue: modern detection systems are not only flagging tools by what they were doing, but also when they were doing it. The functions themselves worked perfectly, but their timing patterns might scream "automation" to behavioral analysis engines.
The converted warehouse apartment in Seattle's SoDo district doesn't look like much from the outside, but behind the reinforced steel door marked "3B," Elena Sterling has built a digital command center that would make most penetration testers jealous. Three curved monitors dominate the main wall. The desk surface disappears beneath notebooks filled with drawings and diagrams showing how innocent role assignments chain together into devastating attack paths.
Elena "Phantom" Sterling earned her reputation the hard way. Unlike the script kiddies and ransomware crews that grab headlines, her specialty lies in surgical precision operations that leave no trace while extracting maximum value. Former colleagues from her days at a major West Coast cybersecurity firm would be shocked to learn that their methodical, regulation-obsessed teammate had evolved into something else entirely—a digital predator who turns organizations' own security measures against them.
**Becoming